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ABSTRACT
Kinsey Reporter is a global mobile app to share, explore,
and visualize anonymous data about sex. Reports are sub-
mitted via smartphone, then visualized on a website or down-
loaded for offline analysis. In this paper we present the ma-
jor features of the Kinsey Reporter citizen science platform
designed to preserve the anonymity of its contributors, and
preliminary data analyses that suggest questions for future re-
search.
INTRODUCTION
The most popular sex applications available on the app mar-
ketplaces, e.g., Tinder, Grindr, and OKCupid, are great for
finding sexual partners, but what happens during those and
other sexual encounters? The original Kinsey Reports [5,
6] famously used face-to-face interviews to ascertain what
really happens between the sheets. Adapting Kinsey’s sur-
vey methodology to use web technology has provided sex
researchers with additional methods for data gathering, but
the increasing ubiquity of mobile computing devices presents
new opportunities. Compared to traditional PCs, smartphone
platforms provide location services and greater access to
users in the developing world.
Kinsey Reporter (kinseyreporter.org) is a global mobile
survey platform to share, explore, and visualize anonymous
data about sex. Reports are submitted via smartphone, then
visualized on the website or downloaded for offline analy-
sis. “Citizen sex scientists” submit reports, each consisting
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of one or more surveys, after participating in or observing
sexual activity. Surveys cover topics such as flirting, sexual
activity, unwanted experience, consumption of pornography,
and hormonal birth control side effects. One of the goals of
the projects is to reveal how norms and behaviors surround-
ing these topics vary depending on geography, so location
data is crucial. For example, some research indicates that
hormonal birth control can differently affect women living
in disparate regions of the world [13]. However the sensitive
nature of these topics necessitates that reports be kept anony-
mous to protect both the participants and the researchers. The
current implementation of Kinsey Reporter balances both of
these demands by collecting no personally-identifying details
and by anonymizing submission time and location with user-
selectable resolution: city, province, or country.
Kinsey Reporter is a joint project of The Kinsey Institute for
Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction and the Center
for Complex Networks and Systems Research, both at Indi-
ana University, Bloomington. Version 2 of Kinsey Reporter
is currently available for iOS in the Apple App Store and for
Android on Google Play. To date, about 8,300 reports have
been tabulated from 32 different countries. The results can be
visualized at kinseyreporter.org/explore.
In this paper we present the major features of the Kinsey Re-
porter platform, and preliminary data that suggest interesting
research questions for future study.
MOTIVATION AND DESIGN
This project aims to contribute to several different bodies of
research surrounding collection and analysis of sensitive and
confidential data.
In order to delineate the various axes of feature space that it
exists in, we have created Kinsey Reporter with an challeng-
ing set of constraints: an open-data, citizen-science platform
that collects data on sensitive and private topics whilst pro-
tecting the anonymity of its users. To be clear, this represents
somewhat of an extreme case as visualized in Figure 1 where
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
04
87
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
16
Figure 1. Two axes of feature space with some social sites located on the
axes for illustration. Placement is approximate, based on typical use of
the sites. KR is Kinsey Reporter.
KR is all the way in the corner. Other applications dealing
with data of varied sensitivity will naturally occupy design
space in between.
With this project, we hope to stimulate discussion on the pros,
cons, and best practices of using citizen science platforms to
collect sensitive data about private behaviors. One such ques-
tion of best practices comes from noting the distinction be-
tween personal data that is “donated”, as in citizen science
platforms, as opposed to data that is exchanged for a service,
as in the case of Foursquare or other such location-enabled
apps. Are the app owners’ obligations to the users different in
these cases? Kinsey Reporter intentionally constrains its data
collection in order to provide anonymity and protect both user
and app provider from liability, but in doing so, does it also
provide an example of the kind of transparency and protec-
tion from unintended use that should be expected of donated
data?
Successfully interviewing subjects about sensitive topics – as
did our namesake Alfred Kinsey – requires first achieving a
certain level of interpersonal trust. Trust is not a binary vari-
able however; varying degrees of trust lead to people shar-
ing different amounts and types of information, depending on
context [2]. In this light, Kinsey Reporter can be seen as a
case study of how the overall platform design can contribute
to the user’s perception of trust.
Research in medical contexts suggests that when people are
unwilling to disclose sensitive, possibly stigmatizing or em-
barrassing information, their fear is along two axes: fear of
judgement and fear that the information will leak beyond
the intended bounds [11]. We hope that Kinsey Reporter’s
strict anonymity protections are understood by users to pro-
tect against both of these fears. In addition, our design ac-
knowledges the social nature of trust and privacy [2, 3]. By
providing users with feedback about others’ responses in the
form of maps (Fig. 2) and aggregated survey results (Fig. 3),
we aim to employ subtle social encouragement to participate.
ANONYMITY FEATURES
Survey topics can be highly sensitive. As such, neither the re-
searcher nor any third-party with data access should be able
to tie a report to a particular user. This implies that we can not
collect demographic or identifying information about partic-
ular users.
Figure 2. A cropped screenshot from the app, showing others’ reports
on a map.
Figure 3. A screenshot from the app. After submission of a report, a
user is able to explore how his or her submissions stack up to the aggre-
gate. This user submitted the tag “stalking”, thus it is highlighted in the
aggregated result.
Figure 4. Empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the num-
ber of tags selected per report. The mean is approximately 16 tags per
response. Only 1% of reports have more than 80 tags.
A stated goal of Kinsey Reporter as a citizen science project
is to provide the data open to all. As a result, pseudonymity
(via usernames) becomes unacceptable: an attacker managing
to de-anonymize one report should not be able to obtain the
user’s report history. Thus we must abandon the concept of
a user identity entirely, and design for total user anonymity.
These two axes of design space are illustrated in Figure 1,
along with some other social web sites.
Due to these hard requirements, we cannot analyze reports
grouped by user. Empirically, users selected 136 thousand
answers in 8300 reports submitted, yielding about 16 selec-
tions per report. The distribution of the number of tags per
response can be seen in Fig. 4. This makes it possible to
examine co-occurrence by report, especially among answers
to questions belonging to the same survey. One can visual-
ize these co-occurrence relationships with the Charts tool at
kinseyreporter.org/explore.
Geo-temporal indistinguishability
Suppose an attacker could observe a user interacting with
Kinsey Reporter, for example in a coffee shop or other pub-
lic place. If reports were posted immediately upon submis-
sion, the attacker could tie a report to the user by refreshing
the report data until one matches the user’s time and place of
submission. To prevent this attack, reports are not made pub-
lic immediately. Instead, recently-received reports sit in the
database without timestamps and remain inaccessible to the
public. These reports are then timestamped and made pub-
lic only once a minimum number k of reports are received
from a particular geographic designation. This protocol is
akin to a user-adjustable, geo-temporal version of Sweeny’s
k-anonymity [12]. The k parameter is selected to tradeoff
between data availability and user anonymity.
For a fixed k, another tradeoff exists between geographic and
time resolution, as low-resolution geographic designations
(e.g., country) will receive more reports in a given time than
those with higher resolution (e.g., city). As a result, high ge-
ographic resolution corresponds to low temporal resolution,
and vice-versa. This design is driven by an uncertainty prin-
ciple: it should not be possible to know both the location and
the time of a report with high precision, as such information
might reveal too much about an individual user. On the down-
side, this protocol can make it difficult to compare data be-
tween rural and urban areas, due to the comparatively lower
number of reports coming from a given rural municipality. It
can also take a long time to accumulate k reports from some
of these more remote areas, causing reports to stay in “limbo”
for long periods of time.
No free text
Free-text responses lend themselves to abuse. For instance,
users could submit nonsense answers to skew results, as in
Mountain Dew’s infamous “Dub the Dew” campaign where
the number one response was “Hitler did nothing wrong”
[10]. More importantly, free-text responses might be used
to reveal (on purpose or not) someone’s identity. This
deanonymization can be on purpose, by answering a question
with text like “John Doe committed sexual assault last night,”
or inadvertently, in the case of stylometric analysis. For ex-
ample, textual analysis may be used to infer demographic in-
formation about the submitter such as age and gender, tie to-
gether multiple reports coming from the same submitter, and
even possibly connect submissions to extant social media ac-
counts [4, 7, 8].
For these reasons, users are not allowed to enter free-text re-
sponses to questions; all questions are multiple-choice. As a
result, surveys must be very carefully crafted so as to avoid
bias.
Unfortunately, there is little preventing users from “stuff-
ing the ballot box” with spurious multiple-choice selections,
since user anonymity precludes us from banning a user. This,
however, cannot be done en-masse, as described next.
Secure communication
The app employs encryption and authentication in its commu-
nication with the Kinsey Reporter servers. First, public-key
encryption (TLS/HTTPS) is a natural requirement to prevent
eavesdropping on the network. Second, shared-key authenti-
cation is used to make it harder for an attacker script to submit
a large volume of junk data to the Kinsey Reporter servers.
There are no trusted third parties. A geocoding service is
used as a third-party to anonymize locations, but never re-
ceives sensitive data. The user’s device only submits its loca-
tion to the service, receiving the current city, state/province,
and country. This lower-resolution location is then sent along
with the report to Kinsey Reporter’s servers.
In this case, the use of a third party for anonymizing location
improves security. By ensuring that the exact location and
the survey results are transmitted to separate remote servers,
a hypothetical adversary needs to eavesdrop on two different
encrypted connections in order to obtain unanonymized data.
SURVEY DATA
The user is presented with multiple surveys she can choose
to answer, for example “Sexual Activity” or “Flirting.” Asso-
ciated with each of these surveys are several questions, e.g.,
Figure 5. Data model: surveys have associated questions, which in turn
contain tags.
Table 1. Countries and US states with the most responses tabulated.
Country Count US State Count
USA 7138 Indiana 2907
Italy 289 California 432
Canada 237 Texas 308
Netherlands 172 Oregon 249
Great Britain 65 Ohio 224
China 63 Michigan 199
Spain 56 Arizona 195
Turkey 51 Illinois 190
Denmark 48 Kentucky 159
Australia 25 New York 147
“How many people involved?” and “Gender flirting.” Like-
wise each question has a number of possible responses, called
tags, such as “multiple partners,” or “male flirting.” Each
of these relationships is one-to-many. The hierarchical data
model is illustrated in Fig. 5.
Geography
While reports have thus far been tabulated from 32 differ-
ent countries, the vast majority come from the US. The top
ten countries by number of responses can be seen in Table 1
along with the top ten US states. Among US states, Indiana is
over-represented due to the disproportionate amount of media
coverage Kinsey Reporter receives in its home state.
While Kinsey Reporter is explicitly global in its mission, it is
limited by the current lack of localization — the app and the
surveys are currently only available in English. The effects of
this limitation are observable in that four of the top five coun-
tries are largely English-speaking. Adding other languages
will increase the potential user base of the platform and en-
able better international comparison of responses.
Survey items
As with the geography, the distribution of responses across
surveys illustrated in Table 2 is skewed, with the Sexual Ac-
tivity survey receiving more responses than all other surveys
combined. In some ways this is expected simply from de-
mographics: with sexual activity broadly defined, this sur-
vey applies to the most people. On the other hand we sus-
pect a large amount of self-selection happening in the survey-
choosing process with the more “fun” surveys receiving more
responses.
Table 2. Surveys and number of tabulated responses for each. Note that
the Porn and Valentine’s Day surveys were released much later than the
others.
Survey Count
Sexual Activity 6605
Flirting 1161
Public Display of Affection 858
Sexual Fetish 827
Porn 528
Female Hormonal Birth Control Use and Effects 519
Unwanted Experience 306
Valentine’s Day 196
Figure 6. Histogram of number of surveys responded to per report. The
majority of reports contain answers to only a single survey.
With the inability to correlate user reports across responses,
co-occurrence relationships must be analyzed from each re-
sponse individually. Since users choose on average 16 tags
per report, we have co-occurrence data that works well when
correlating responses to a single survey, e.g., sexual activ-
ity given relationship status, as both questions are from the
Sexual Activity survey. However, as shown in Fig. 6, most
responses contain answers from a single survey, thus some-
what limiting the ability to deduce co-occurrence relation-
ships across surveys, e.g., sexual activity given flirting loca-
tion.
Preliminary results
While Kinsey Reporter is still a work in progress, it has tabu-
lated a fair amount of data, albeit from a rather narrow set of
surveys and locations. One co-occurrence relationship from
the Sexual Activity survey is shown in Fig. 7, illustrating sex-
ual activity given relationship description. The chart shows
expected relationships, such as increased incidence of oral
sex amongst those in casual relationships [9], but also unex-
pected features such as the increased incidence of anal sex in
casual encounters (392 reports). While these results are far
from conclusive, these two examples combine to demonstrate
the potential values of Kinsey Reporter’s data: substantiating
existing claims with a new source of data, and raising new
questions to be further researched.
FUTURE WORK
Figure 7. Sexual activity given relationship description, based on 5453 reports containing answers to both questions. Responses can include more than
one activity. This chart was created with the Explore tool at kinseyreporter.org/explore.
Recent scholarly work has been done on privacy-preserving
location-based services, including differential privacy models
where the user selects the level of geographic resolution at
which she is visible [1]. As mentioned previously, Kinsey
Reporter’s current protocol can cause reports coming from
low volume areas to stay in the queue for long periods of time.
We are interested in adapting some of these new techniques
to preserve geo-indistinguishability while reducing the time
lag before making reports public.
As mentioned previously and as seen in Fig. 6, the fact that
the vast majority of submissions contain answers to only one
survey somewhat limits the ability to analyze inter-survey co-
occurrence relationships. A reasonable null model of user be-
havior might suggest half as many users submit responses to
two surveys as opposed to a single submission, with the num-
ber of submissions decreasing geometrically with the number
of surveys responded to, as seen in Figure 8. The overwhelm-
ing tendency to answer a single survey suggests that users
may not appreciate that a report can contain responses to more
than one survey (as is indeed desirable from the researchers’
viewpoint).
Future collaboration with the human-computer interaction
community may yield insights about how users interpret and
experience the app, which in turn will allow us to analyze
the data using stronger assumptions. We also welcome sug-
gestions about necessary improvements and high-priority en-
hancements to attract higher volumes of data world-wide. In-
ternationalization is also a high priority at this juncture. Our
Figure 8. A null model prediction for number of surveys responded to
per report. The difference with Fig. 6 may suggest a design flaw.
focus is explicitly international but our current batch of sur-
veys are all in English.
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